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We would like to thank J. J. Bissell for an interesting and thorough comment on 
our 2015 ​Business History ​ article, and which provides an alternative view on a 
potential model for the development of the British banking sector.  The comment 
2
is a useful contribution to the debate and a continuation of our work. We also 
direct readers to another (more hypothetical) extension of this work where 
potential models of the growth and subsequent decline of the population are 
modelled.  Rather than dissect each aspect of the comment in turn, we think it 
3
might be more useful to respond to certain points and then make some general 
points about the advantages of different modelling approaches. This lends 
insight to both the modelled system and the modelling process itself. In what 
follows below we deal with two issues: first, the question of births (creations) in 
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3 Philip Garnett, “A Tipping Point in 300 Years of Banking? A Conceptual 
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the banking population; and second, the question of why 1810 marks a 'tipping 
point' in the historical demography of British banking. 
 
The Question of Births 
The question of whether the creation of a bank is a ​birth ​ process is worth 
revisiting. Obviously, it is not literally a birth process in the biological sense of 
parent banks producing new offspring banks. Nevertheless, many banks are 
formed as descendants of existing banks, while others are formed independently 
as new entities. In any case, the data show a distinct link between the size of the 
population of banks and probability (or rate) at which new banks enter the 
system. As Bissell confirms this feature of the system, we can focus on the 
interesting historical question of why this was the case not only during 
increasing number of banks before 1810, but conversely in subsequent two 
centuries of declining population of banks and declining bank creation rate.  
 
As we were, and still are, unable to determine and plausible reason for this link 
between creation and population size we did not establish this relationship in 
our agent-based model. In fact, this is why we produce models and simulations 
as ways of testing simplified versions of a real system. The purpose of our 
agent-based model was to take plausible rules for the real banking system, that 
we can justify either historically or based on an understanding of the banking 
system, and test to see if those rules will reproduce the dynamics of the observed 
data. Indeed the agent-based model had no specified relationship between the 
number of banks and the rate of creation of new banks, and yet the simulation 
matched the data without this relationship. This leaving it an open question what 
this potential relationship meant for the real system.  
 
Bissell’s model usefully confirms this relationship as a feature of the data, but 
still does not explain why it exists. Is a feature of the ​real​ banking sector? Is it an 
artefact in the data? The remarkable rise and subsequent 200-year decline in the 
number of banks is worth further investigation by historians as well as complex 
systems modellers, potentially in collaboration, allowing the investigation of 
historical data and counterfactual processes.  
 
We looked again at our data and found that during growth in bank population 
prior to 1810 there was also a higher rate of new bank creation (Figure 1). Since 
failure rate of banks remains proportional to the population size, the link is 
relevant for the entire time period, not just the post-1810 period. In the 
hypothetical model presented by in Garnett (2015) the formation of new banks 
prior to 1810 is dependent on a supply of new partners for banks, which is a 
proxy for the supply of money.  It is possible, even likely, that demand drove the 
4
creation of new banks before 1810. This is consistent with the general history of 
money, banking and industrialization in this period.  This could have led to a 
5
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Press, 2004), 147–74, doi:10.1017/CHOL9780521820363.007. 
bubble in the creation of banks, incentivised by the perception of profitability 
and need for banking, manifested in an exponential increase in the population of 
banks.  
 
Perhaps would-be entrepreneurs were dissuaded by the declining numbers of 
banks after 1810, or the market was saturated with banks and so unpropitious, 
or the barriers to entry began to increase as banking functions became more 
complex. These questions cannot be answered by models and simulations, but 
can help to problematize historical research question to address this issues. 
 
 
Figure 1: British Banking demographic change.  
When is a Tipping Point a Turning Point? 
What, then, explains the importance of 1810 as a turning point in the 
demography of British banks? In our article in 2015 we suggested that this 
would be the object of future research.  However, the answer is relatively 
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straightforward and is present in the existing banking history literature. Two 
explanations presented themselves to us on the basis of what we knew about the 
demography and the importance of amalgamation and failure.  
 
The first is that 1810 marks the moment when the first joint-stock banks were 
introduced (in Scotland), so providing a means of effective amalgamation the 
absorption of business operations and balance sheets. On the surface this 
explanation is attractive because it puts an earlier date (1810) on the emergence 
of the organizational form (joint-stock banks) that certainly became a significant 
reason for the amalgamation movement in England after they were allowed in 
England and Wales from 1826.  So this explanation goes, Scotland would be the 
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leading edge of this broader secular change in the organizational form of the 
population of banks as a whole; this change might then have triggered long-run 
change in the population. Unfortunately, as the history Scottish banks make 
clear, though 1810 ​was​ the date when the first joint-stock bank appeared in 
Scotland, the next Scottish joint stock bank did not appear until fifteen years 
later around 1825.  Further, when we look at the banks that actually disappeared 
8
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in this period, they were largely failing without being amalgamated into other 
banks (see Figure 2). Between 1795 and 1825, 253 banks failed, 159 banks 
ceased business or were wound-up, and just 29 were merged, taken-over, or 
amalgamated. Of those that were amalgamated only four were in Scotland, and 
the rest in England and Wales. Of the majority of the banks that ceased or failed 
the vast majority were English "country banks". The emergence of the first 
joint-stock bank in Scotland in 1810 is simply a misleading coincidence with the 
peak of the population in our data.  
 
The second explanation must therefore be with the failure of the country banks 
in years following 1810. Though 1810 is the moment of peak population and 
represents a demographic change of direction, Figure 2 clearly indicates that 
while there was an increase in the number of exits in 1810 it was the period 
1813-1816 that represents the period of greatest exit, where 1816 was the peak. 
This is also confirmed the main histories of the country banks.   Figure 2 shows 
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that banks "ceasing" was the predominant type of exit before 1814, thereafter 
replaced by "failure" as the main type of exit, though in practice "ceased" and 
"failed" express the same essential fact. Figure 2 also shows that while the 
absolute number of amalgamations was low in comparison to other forms of exit, 
amalgamation intensified across the period becoming much more common after 
1810. After 1826 the history of amalgamations is well known.  Before 1826, 
10
HarperCollins, 1975), 293. 
9 Margaret Dawes and C.N. Ward-Perkins, ​Country Banks of England and Wales 
(Canterbury: CIB Publishing, 2000); Leslie Sedden Pressnell, ​Country Banking in 
the Industrial Revolution ​ (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956). 
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however, it is largely the failure of country banks that explains "exits" from the 




Figure 2: Decomposed exits from bank population, 1795-1825 (two axes: "ceased 
and failed to the right; merged to the left). 
 
Country banks had increased in number in the 18th Century as Britain's 
industrial economy grew.  They were partnerships limited to no more than six 
11
partners, were private companies, did not have limited liability, and issued notes.
 The growth in country banking business was therefore connected to an 
12
11 A useful survey of the growth in country banks can be found in "Chapter 7: The 
regional growth of provincial banking, 1700-1796" in Gareth Turner, “English 
Banking in the Eighteenth Century: Bankers, Merchants and the Creation of the 
English Financial System” (Durham University, 2015), 170–193, 
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increase in the volume of money in circulation. In 1797 the Bank of England 
allowed note issue under the value of £5 for the first time while at the same time 
suspending the convertibility of specie for gold. This was also a period of a trade 
boom.  The banks issued notes on the basis of their assets which included loans. 
13
Lending to business was largely via overdrafts. As Brunt observes, '​[a]​t first 
glance, the country banks' portfolios were highly liquid ... [h]owever, these 
overdrafts were only liquid if the businesses were in a position to repay the 
money.' So if a  business suffered a downturn and were unable to repay its 
overdraft it could in turn cause the bank distress and provoke a run. This, and a 
lack of diversity in country bank lending patterns, 'frequently caused bank 
failures and brought many other banks to the brink of catastrophe.'  When there 
14
was a contraction in trade in 1810 following the boom of the preceding years, 
and a need to pay for imports of food caused by rising food prices in the years 
that followed, the reduction in the domestic circulation of money caused the 
over-extended country banks to begin to fail through a combination of illiquidity 
and insolvency. Country banks were sensitive to changes in the volume of 
currency in circulation.  The rot began to set in probably as early as late 1810: 
15
 
It is not to be forgotten that during the second quarter of 1810 ...  the crest 
Country Banking in the Industrial Revolution ​. 
13 Samuel Evelyn Thomas, ​The Rise and Growth of Joint Stock Banking ​ (London: 
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the First Industrial Revolution,” ​The Journal of Economic History ​ 66, no. 01 
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Street? The Bank Restriction Act and the Regime Shift to Paper Money, 
1797-1821,” EHES Working Papers in Economic History, 2016. 
of the commercial wave was quivering; prices had begun to sag. During the 
third quarter, after the [Bullion] Report was presented, the failures 
began–and the Bank did more discounting than in any single quarter of that 
whole generation. It was giving all the support that it could. The country 
banks had lost their nerve, as the curtailment of their note stampings show; 
and the autumn tide of bankruptcies was setting in.  
16
 
Some country banks were, then, vulnerable to adverse external environmental 
changes. As Figure 2 shows, while the number of failures fell dramatically to 
1819, they grew again to 1823-25, a well known banking crisis that eventually 
led to the introduction of joint-stock banking in England and Wales.   
17
 
We can also use this historical episode to caution against a deterministic account 
of causation. While 1810 is a demographic tipping point in the population of the 
banks, whether it represents a historical event–as a singular moment or period 
when something happens that causes or forces things to change–is at least 
questionable. Though Clapham, above, points the change occurring from 1810 
and there is a clear reversal of the demographic trend for growth that existed 
before 1810, the number of failures intensified over a six year period in our data, 
1810-1816. And though "exits" from the population went from seven in 1809 to 
16 John Harold Clapham, ​The Bank of England: A History ​ (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1944), 25–26; Thomas, ​The Rise and Growth of Joint Stock 
Banking ​, 33. 
17 Collins, ​Money and Banking in the UK: A History ​, 15–17; Larry Neal, “The 
Financial Crisis of 1825 and the Restructuring of the British Financial System,” 
Review​ 80, no. May/June (1998): 53–76, 
https://files.stlouisfed.org/files/htdocs/publications/review/98/05/9805ln.pdf. 
nineteen in 1810 this was small compared to the size of the population as whole, 
and considerably lower than the number of exits (61) in 1816. This helps us to 
problematize and periodize change processes, which is especially helpful when 
switching between long-run (demographic) and short-run (business-historical) 
time-frames. As we argued in our 2015 article, demographic approaches can be 
useful in the problematization of new historiographic questions and the revision 
of the existing historiography but we also must caution against determinism, or 
looking for dogs that bark. In our 2015 article the principal graph (Figure 2 p. 
184) indicated that 1810 was a demographical tipping point. What Figure 3 
below indicates is that the period 1813-1816 marks a greater period of crisis in 
the population than 1810-1816, and so those years may offer greater potential 
for historical studies to examine how and why individual country banks went 





Figure 3: All exits from bank population 1795-1825. 
 
Conclusion 
Our original paper and the contribution of J.J. Bissell highlight that there are 
system level processes at work in the British banking sector that are driving 
some of the macro-level behaviour. These simplified models and simulations 
allow us to test plausible assumptions for system behaviour, and perhaps tell us 
most when they prove our assumptions as false. As it is when our assumptions 
are credible challenged that we must look for additional evidence. In this case 
our assumptions are not proved false, however the assumptions and their 
mechanistic implementation in the simulation highlight other areas where our 
understanding of the British banking system is lacking, which invites future 
historical research. Revisiting this problem has allowed us to challenge another 
of our initial assumptions, which was that the tipping point in the size of the 
bank population in 1810 was indeed a tipping point. Taking a second look, with 
the benefit of additional modelling and in light of the banking history literature 
that covers the period indicates that this change in the population is more the 
symptom of a combination of changes operating at different temporal scales, and 
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